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BANKRUPTCY--SECTION 522(d)(10)(E)-DEBTOR MAY NOT EXEMPT
FUTURE KEOGH FUND PAYMENTS FROM THE BANKRUPTCY
ESTATE

Clark v. ONeill (In re Robert H. Clark) (1983)

Robert H. Clark, a forty-three year old licensed marriage and family
therapist, filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code
(Code),' listing his Keogh retirement account, 2 valued at $31,218.00, 3 as exempt from the property of his bankruptcy estate 4 under section
522(d)(10)(E) of the Code.5 The interim trustee objected to the claimed ex1. Clark v. O'Neill (In re Robert H. Clark), 711 F.2d 21, 22 (3d Cir. 1983). The
petition was filed on September 18, 1981. Id. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982), or Bankruptcy Code (Code), provides two alternative avenues of relief for the individual debtor. Chapter 7 is essentially a liquidation
device for the orderly distribution of the debtor's assets to his creditors, resulting in a
discharge of the debtor from his obligations. See A. COHEN, BANKRUPTCY, SECURED
TRANSACTIONS AND OTHER DEBTOR-CREDITOR MATTERS $ 13-301, at 46 & n.2
(1981). Alternatively, under Chapter 13 of the Code, an individual debtor with a
regular income may obtain confirmation of a plan providing for adjustment of his
debts and receive a discharge. Id.
2. 711 F.2d at 22. The Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962
authorized Keogh plans in an effort to place a self-employed individual-sole proprietor or partner-making retirement-fund contributions for his own benefit on an
equal footing with an employee who benefits from a plan established by his employer. See S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2964, 2971. This is accomplished by treating the self-employed
person as both an owner and employee. Id. at 10. Contributions to Keogh plans are
tax deductible from current income to a limited extent for the owner/employee.
I.R.C. § 404(a)(8) (1982). Assets held in Keogh funds are not taxable to the beneficiary until they are actually distributed. Id. § 402(a)(1). However, the beneficiary's
right to receive the funds vests at the time the contribution is made. Id.
§ 401(d) (2) (A). In the event the beneficiary withdraws funds from the Keogh account before he reaches 591/2 years of age, he is barred from making tax exempt contributions to the plan for five years. Id. § 401(d)(5)(C). Moreover, the beneficiary
who prematurely withdraws Keogh funds must pay a 10% penalty tax in addition to
the income tax due on the amount withdrawn. Id. § 72(m)(5).
3. Clark v. O'Neill (In re Robert H. Clark), No. 82-0494, slip op. at 2 (Bankr.
D.N.J. Sept. 28, 1982). Clark established his I.R.S.-approved retirement account on
December 20, 1975. Id. As of July 30, 1982, his account had a market value of
$31,218.00. Id
4. 711 F.2d at 22. Under the Code, the commencement of a case creates an
estate consisting of property of the debtor to become available for distribution to
creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982). See also A. COHEN, supra note 1, at 52.
For a further discussion of the determination of the property of the estate, see
notes 43-45 and accompanying text infra.
5. 711 F.2d at 22. Clark elected to claim an exemption for the Keogh account
under § 522(d)(10)(E) of the Code. Id. Section 522(d)(10)(E) provides as follows:

(831)
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emption. 6 Clark, in turn, filed a complaint in the United States Bankruptcy
7
Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking a denial of the objection.
The sole issue before the bankruptcy court was whether the assets in
Clark's Keogh retirement account, from which he had not withdrawn any
funds, were protected from the reach of his creditors under section
522(d)(10)(E), which exempts "[t]he debtor's right to receive. . . a payment
under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the
extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor .. *"8 The bank(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1)
of this section:
(10)

The debtor's right to receive(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability,
death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for
the support of the debtor, unless(i) such plan or contract was established by or under the
auspices of an insider that employed the debtor at the time the
debtor's rights under such plan or contract arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service;
and
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section
401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408 or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 (26 U.S.C. [§§] 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408 or 409 [(1982)].
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982). Subsection (iii) requires that the plan for which an
exemption is claimed fall within those sections of the Internal Revenue Code which
define the pension, stock bonus, or profitsharing plans, annuities, individual retirement accounts and retirement bonds which qualify for favorable tax treatment. See
I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 409 (1982).
6. 711 F.2d at 22. The essence of the interim trustee's objection was that Clark's
claimed exemption did not fall within the literal terms of § 522(d)(10)(E) because he
had no present "right to receive [payments]" from his Keogh plan. See id. For a
discussion of the approaches courts have taken to the argument that § 522(d)(10)(E)
requires a present entitlement, see notes 53-57 and accompanying text infra.
7. 711 F.2d at 22. See In re Robert H. Clark, No. 82-0494 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept.
28, 1982).
8. 711 F.2d at 22 & n.1 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (10) (E) (1982)). The bankruptcy court did not consider whether the Keogh fund was properly included within
the gross bankruptcy estate, but only whether these assets, once included, fell within
the § 522(d)(10)(E) exemption. See id.
Three distinct arguments have been advanced to protect the different forms of
retirement-fund assets from distribution to creditors in bankruptcy. The first is that
the fund is analogous to a spendthrift trust, and thus excluded from the bankruptcy
estate under § 541(c)(2), which provides that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982).
See Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983); Clotfelter v. CIBAGEIGY Corp. (In re Threewitt), 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982). For a discussion of
this approach, see note 45 infra. The second argument is that the prohibitions against
assignment and alienation of retirement funds, set forth in sections 206(d)(1) and
1021(c) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, constitute federal
law exemptions. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1982). See also Barr v. Hinshaw (In re
Hinshaw), 23 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). For a discussion of this analysis, see
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ruptcy court found that Clark would have no "right to receive [payments]"
from his Keogh fund for several years.9 Consequently, the court held that
his claimed exemption of future payments did not come within the literal
terms of section 522(d)(10)(E).') On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit I1 affirmed, holding that section 522 (d) (10) (E)
of the Code does not exempt future Keogh fund payments from the debtor's
bankruptcy estate. Clark v. O'Neill (In re Robert I. Clark), 711 F.2d 21 (3d
Cir. 1983).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Code) was the product of a tenyear congressional effort to analyze, evaluate, and revise federal bankruptcy
law.' 2 An overriding purpose of the Code is to provide the individual debtor
note 51 infra. The final argument is that raised by Clark in this case: that Keogh
fund assets, though properly included in the gross bankruptcy estate, fall within the
§ 522(d)(10)(E) exemption for pension and annuity payments. See Robert Clark, No.
82-0494, slip op. at 2. For a discussion of the various approaches to exempting retirement benefits under § 522(d)(10)(E), see notes 53-79 and accompanying text tnfra.
9. Robert Clark, No. 82-0494, slip op. at 2. The bankruptcy court found that "the
debtor . . . may not, without penalty, withdraw funds from said account until he
attains the age of 59 and one-half years. An exception is the occurrence of death or
disability." Id. See I.R.C. § 401(d)(4)(B) (1982). See alsoJ. CHOMMIE, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 96 (2d ed. 1973). For a discussion of the restrictions
on Keogh plans, see note 2 supra.
10. See 711 F.2d at 22. The bankruptcy court reviewed the legislative history of
§ 522(d)(10)(E), specifically the parallel retirement fund exemption provisions of earlier proposals. Robert Clark, No. 82-0494, slip op. at 3-5 (citing UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACT § 6, 13 U.L.A. 365, 381-82 (1980); PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 4-503(c), REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,

H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
For the text and a discussion of these provisions, see notes 47
& 50 and accompanying text infra. The court noted that Congress had considered
and rejected broad language clearly extending the exemption to all retirement plan
interests, regardless of when rights accrued. Robert Clark, No. 82-0494, slip op. at 7-8.
The bankruptcy court concluded that in adopting the "payments made" language of
§ 522(d)(10)(E), Congress had rejected the suggestion to include all funds constituting debtors' retirement plan accounts. Id. at 8 (citing In re Richard Clark, 18 Bankr.
824 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Mendenhall, 4 Bankr. 127 (Bankr. D. Ore.
1980)). For a discussion of Richard Clark, see notes 54-57 and accompanying text infra.
For a discussion of Mendenhall, see notes 31, 33, 75 & 76 and accompanying text infra.
For a presentation and analysis of the proposition that a § 522(d)(10)(E) exemption is
available only where a debtor enjoys a present right to receive the payments from the
fund, see notes 53-57 and accompanying text infra.
11. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Gibbons and Becker, and Judge
Weber of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania,
sitting by designation. Judge Gibbons wrote the majority opinion. Judge Becker
filed a concurring opinion.
COMMISSION REPORT].

12. H.R.

MILLER &

M.L. COOK, A

PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE BANKRUPTCY

ACT 6-7 (1979). In 1968, congressional hearings led to the appointment of
the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. The Commission
reported a vast increase in the number of bankruptcy filings in the preceding 20 years
and a widespread feeling among judges and legislators that bankruptcy administration needed substantial improvement, and observed that current procedures were
marked by disproportionate expenses to creditors and non-uniform application of the
Act. See id.
REFORM
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who in good faith complies with its provisions an opportunity for a fresh
start, free from creditor harassment and the pressures of excessive debt. 13
It has long been recognized that economic rehabilitation requires not
only that a debtor in bankruptcy receive a discharge from his existing debts
but also that he be allowed to exempt some of his property from liquidation
and distribution to creditors. 14 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Act), the
Code's predecessor, permitted a debtor to retain property exemptible under
state law. 1 5 This approach led to disparate treatment of debtors under the
16
widely divergent state law exemptions.
13. 9 AM. JUR. 2d Bankruptcy § 302 (1980). Congress noted that the Code reflects "a position that there is a Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes
through bankruptcy comes out with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start."
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 126, reprted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5963, 6087. See also Comment, Protection of a Debtor's "Fresh Start" Under the
New Bankruptcy Code, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 843 (1980). This commentator regards the

enactment of the Code as "a major shift in the traditional balance between debtors'
and creditors' interests in bankruptcy." Id. at 843. While noting that the Code
strengthens creditors' rights by more clearly defining them, the "primary focus" of
the Code "is to enable debtors to maintain their independent economic existences
after bankruptcy." Id. at 843-44 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, supra, at 4-5).
While the Code has increased the priority of the fresh start doctrine, the policy is
an inherent part of all bankruptcy systems. See Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77
(1904). In Wetmore, the Court concluded that the purpose of bankruptcy laws was "to
relieve the honest debtor from the weight of indebtedness which has become oppressive, and to permit him to have a fresh start in business or commercial life, free from
the obligations and responsibilities which may have resulted from his misfortunes."
Id. A decade later, the Court observed that the Act's purpose was to distribute the
debtor's assets to his creditors and then provide him with a fresh start. See Williams
v. United States Fidelity Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915). This philosophy was reaffirmed by the Court in Local Loan Co. o. Hunt. See 292 U.S. 234 (1934). Denying the
enforceability of an assignment of future wages, the Court noted that the fresh start
doctrine
has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being of public as
well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor
who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of
bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, un-

hampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.
Id. at 244 (emphasis supplied by the Court). For a brief synopsis of the evolution of
the fresh start doctrine, see Comment, supra, at 846-50.
14. See, e.g., Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) ("[i]t is the twofold
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to convert the estate of the bankrupt into cash and
then distribute it among creditors and then to give the bankrupt a fresh start with
such exemptions and rights as the statute left untouched"); In re Beckerford, 3 F. Cas.
26, 27 (C.C.D. Mo. 1870) (No. 1,209) ("the state, for its own purposes, and the wellbeing of the individual and family, has secured what are deemed necessaries, against
the claims of creditors").
15. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (1898) (amended
by Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840, 847 (1938)) (repealed 1978).
16. See UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACT, supra note 10, pref. note; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, Part I, at 127; Vukowich, Debtors'Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REV. 769 (1980). The prefatory note to the Uniform
Exemptions Act observed that
[s]tudents who have examined the exemption laws of the several states
are always astounded by the enormous disparity that characterizes these
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In response to the preceived unfairness of this disparity, and the inadequacy of state law exemptions in general, a judicial exemption of sorts was
created.1 7 In Lines v. Frederick,'8 the United States Supreme Court grafted
the fresh start policy onto the definition of the "property" of the debtor
which passed to the trustee under the Act. 9 "Property," the Lines Court
held, did not include those assets of the debtor necessary to "give the debtor
a 'new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort unhampered by
the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.' "20 In Lines, the
debtor's vacation pay, accrued prior to the date of the bankruptcy filing but
collectible only during the annual shutdown or upon termination of employment, was deemed necessary to his ability to make a fresh start and therefore
laws. Some recognize no homestead exemption, and others allow a homestead to be claimed with hardly any effective limitation on its value. Some
allow a practically unlimited exemption in an unmatured life insurance
policy, whereas others restrict such an exemption to a policy of a specified
face amount or to a policy acquired by a specified annual premium. Some
allow the exemption of an automobile with little or no qualification, and
others do not appear to recognize any exemption of an automobile.
UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACT, supra note 10, pref. note, at 366. One commentator has
noted that because the state exemption laws have not been modernized, "dollar limitations on exempt property established years ago have been rendered unrealistic by
the passage of time and the pressures of inflation." Vukowich, supra at 772.
17. See Comment, supra note 13, at 848-50. In addition to the disparate treatment guaranteed by varying state exemption provisions, debtors were faced with
creditors who frustrated the purposes of bankruptcy laws either by taking liens on
exemptible property, which were "consensual" and therefore enforceable, or by taking liens on other necessary property and then exacting a reaffirmation of the preexisting debt after discharge in order to avoid enforcement of the lien. Id. at 848-49.
Fortunately, the courts were aware that these techniques, "coupled with antiquated
state exemption laws, might deny debtors a fresh start under the Act by leaving them
with a discharge and little else." I. at 849.
18. 400 U.S. 18 (1970) (per curiam) (overruled by statute 1978).
19. Id. at 19. See Comment, supra note 13, at 849. See also Bankruptcy Act of
1898, ch. 541, § 70(a)(5), 30 Stat. 544, 565-66 (1898) (amended by Chandler Act, ch.
575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840, 879-80 (1938)) (repealed 1978). The Act provided that
the trustee of the estate of a bankrupt

. . .

shall

. . .

be vested by the opera-

tion of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the
petition . . . except insofar as it is property which is held to be exempt, to
all of thefollowtng kinds ofproperty wherever located .. .(5) property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any
means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold
under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered . ...

Id. (emphasis added).
The Court in Lbhes observed that in defining the scope of the term "property,"
earlier cases had indicated that" ' '[i]t is impossible to give any categorical definition
to the word 'property,' nor can we attach to it in certain relations the limitations
which would be attached to it in others.""' 400 U.S. at 19 (quoting Segal v.
Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966) (quoting Fisher v. Cushman, 103 F. 860, 864 (1st
Cir. 1900))).
20. 400 U.S. at 19 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (citations omitted by the Lines Court)).
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it did not become property of the estate. 2
In Kokoszka v.Be/ford,22 the Supreme Court refused to extend the Lines
exemption to income tax refunds which were based on earnings prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition.23 The Court rejected the argument that
tax refunds should be treated like vacation pay because both were "wage
based," noting that only the vacation pay in Lines was designed to function
as a wage substitute at some future period and, during that future period, to
'support the basic requirements of life for [the debtors] and their families
.. . 24 The Kokoszka Court distinguished tax refunds, which it found
were "not the equivalent of future wages for the purpose of giving the bankrupt a 'fresh start.' "25
Considerable confusion developed when the lower courts attempted to
26
characterize various forms of retirement benefits under the Lines analysis.
Under one approach, the extent to which the debtor could control or withdraw the funds determined whether they were "sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past and so little entangled with the bankrupt's ability to make
an unencumbered fresh start" that they should be treated as property of the
bankruptcy estate. 27 In Mason v.Eastman Kodak Co. (In re Parker),28 where the
21. 400 U.S. at 18, 20. The Court observed that it had previously held that a
business-generated loss carryback tax refund "was 'sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past and so little entangled with the bankrupt's ability to make an unencumbered fresh start that it should be regarded as property under § 70(a)(5) [of the
Bankruptcy Act].' " Id. at 20 (quoting Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966)).
Applying this test, the Court excluded the vacation pay from the debtor's bankruptcy
estate because
[t]he wage-earning bankrupt who must take a vacation without pay or
forgo a vacation altogether cannot be said to have achieved the "new opportunity in life and [the] clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt," which it was the purpose
of the statute to provide.
Id. at 20 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citations omitted by the Lines Court)).
22. 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
23. Id.at 647-48.
24. Id.at 648 (quoting Lines, 400 U.S. at 20) (emphasis suplied by the Kokoszka
Court). The Kokoszka Court reasoned that a tax refund was not necessary for a
debtor's fresh start because it was not a periodic source of income required for the
basic support of the debtor. Id.(citation omitted).
25. 417 U.S. at 647. "[T]herefore," the Court concluded, "the income tax refund is 'sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past' to be defined as property under
§ 70(a)(5)." Id.at 648 (quoting Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966)).
26. For a discussion of cases representing inconsistent approaches, see notes 2740 and accompanying text infra. Prior to Lines, characterizations of retirement benefits for purposes of defining the debtor's estate had been based on a number of considerations, including state law, the source of the benefits, and the beneficiary's vested
interest. See generally Annot., 34 A.L.R. FED. 316 (1977).
27. See Eisenberg v. Baviello (In re Baviello), 12 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1981) (Keogh plan to which debtor's access was limited only by tax penalty constitutes property of the estate under § 70(a)(5)). For a further discussion of Bavie/lo, see
notes 32-34 and accompanying text infra.
28. 473 F. Supp. 746 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss3/10

6

Spencer: Bankruptcy - Section 522(d)(10)(E) - Debtor May Not Exempt Future

1983-84]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

debtor's power to draw against his pension trust was limited to circumstances of hardship, the trust did not become property of the estate. 29 The
Parker court reasoned that these restrictions effectively precluded use of the
fund for any purpose other than the future support of the bankrupt and his
dependents. 30 However, in In re Mendenhal/3 l and Eisenberg v. Baiello (In re
Bavt'ello), 32 Keogh plans which were subject to the debtors' unconditional
right of withdrawal were deemed property of the estate. 33 As the Baviello
court explained, the debtor's right to manage the fund and make withdrawals "are indicia that this fund need not function as a substitute for future
wages" and thus it was properly treated as property available for distribu34
tion to creditors.
In Nunnally v. Nunnally (In re Nunnally)35 and Turp'n v. Wenle (In re Turprn), 36 the Fifth Circuit held that pension benefits to which the debtors
would not be entitled until some time in the future did not become property
of the estate. 37 The Fifth Circuit did not address the issue in terms of the
29. Id. at 751. In Parker, the debtor would have been required to demonstrate
"financial need and a serious medical or casualty emergency" to get a hardship withdrawal. Id.The Parker court also rejected the argument that the debtor's right to
borrow against the fund constituted access sufficient to define the fund as property of
the estate, noting that such loans were limited in both amount and duration, and
prevented further participation in the plan. Id.
30. Id.Because the use of the fund was so limited, the Parker court determined
that it was intertwined with the debtor's ability to make a fresh start and therefore
preserved the fund for his benefit. Id.See Eisenberg v. Baviello (In re Baviello), 12
Bankr. 412, 415 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
31. 4 Bankr. 127 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1980).
32. 12 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
33. See Eisenberg v. Baviello (In re Baviello), 12 Bankr. 412, 415 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1981) (Keogh fund from which debtor could withdraw at any time, subject
only to a tax penalty, the lesser of his contributions or the account balance); In re
Mendenhall, 4 Bankr. 127, 129 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1980) (prototype Keogh plan allowing withdrawal at any time).
34. 12 Bankr. at 415 (citing In re Mace, 16 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 254
(Bankr. D. Ore. 1978) (debtor's Individual Retirement Account subject to such a
high degree of control by the debtor that it is property included in the bankruptcy
estate)). Neither the Baviello court nor the Mace court viewed the tax penalty as a
sufficiently significant deterrent so as to constitute a limitation on the debtor's power
of withdrawal. See Baviello, 12 Bankr. at 415. See also Mace, 16 COLLIER BANKR. CAS.
(MB) at 261. For a discussion of the tax penalty as a restriction on access, see note 55
and accompanying text infra.
35. 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975).
36. 644 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1981).
37. See Turpin, 644 F.2d at 474-75; Nunnally, 506 F.2d at 1026. In Nunnally, the
court excluded the debtor's Navy retirement benefits from his creditor's reach. 506
F.2d at 1025. In Turptn, the Fifth Circuit again excluded the debtor's retirement
plans-two trusts-from the bankruptcy estate. 644 F.2d at 473-74. In Turpin, the
Fifth Circuit expressly denied that its holding in Nunnally was based on the debtor's
immediate need for the benefits, which would imply that the "fresh start" to which
the debtor was entitled was intended only "to get the bankrupt back on his feet in the
period immediately following the bankruptcy." Id.at 475. "Indeed," the court observed, "it appears that in Nunnaly as here the bankrupt was not even entitled to
receive any of these benefits until some time in the future." Id.
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debtors' power to control the funds. 38 Instead, the court focused on the fact
39
As the
that the funds were designed to function as future wage substitutes.
Turpin court reasoned, "Providing the bankrupt with a 'fresh start' means
assuring him that assets to which he may become entitled in the future will be
'40
acquired free of any pre-bankruptcy obligations."
Thus, the proper treatment of retirement funds was not resolved under
the Act, and it was in part "to obviate this analytical conundrum" that the
Code was enacted, with a new approach to providing the debtor a fresh
start. 4 1 Under the Act, title to exempt property remained in the bankrupt;
exempt property was never included in the bankruptcy estate. 42 In contrast,
section 541 of the Code provides that "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case" become property of
the bankruptcy estate, subject to later exemption. 43 The legislative history
of section 541 reveals that Congress intended to include as property of the
38. See Turpin, 644 F.2d at 474-75; Nunnally, 506 F.2d at 1026. Since, in both
cases, the funds were not subject to the debtors' control, this factor may have been
implicit in the Fifth Circuit's conclusions. However, the court did not discuss the
issue, nor did it cite any of the cases decided on this basis. See i. For a discussion of
the cases treating the debtor's control over the retirement fund as dispositive, see
notes 27-34 and accompanying text supra.
39. Nunnally, 506 F.2d at 1026 (citing Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 648
(1974) (if the interest is "designed to function as a wage substitute at some future
period and during that future period, to support the basic requirements of life," then
the property does not pass to the trustee) (emphasis supplied by the Kokoszka Court)).
40. Turpin, 644 F.2d at 475 (emphasis supplied by the court). The Fifth Circuit
continued:
Future wages may not be garnished to pay those obligations and pension
benefits received in the future, even though they may be the product of prebankruptcy contributions to a pension fund, are a substitute for future
wages and thus pass to the bankrupt free of the claims of pre-bankruptcy
creditors.
Id
41. See Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 578 (5th Cir. 1983). The legislative history of the Code noted that, under the Act, the law defining what was property of the estate was "a complicated melange of references to state law, and d[id]
little to further the bankruptcy policy of distribution of the debtor's property to his
creditors in satisfaction of his debts." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 13, at 175 (footnote omitted). Nor were the debtor's interests adequately protected, for the
nonuniform, antiquated and ineffective state laws
presented debtors with a dilemma: they could refrain from seeking relief in
bankruptcy far beyond the time at which they might realistically be able to
pay their obligations, or they could file in bankruptcy and obtain a discharge from past liabilities at the cost of losing even those basic items necessary to carry on a civilized existence.
Comment, supra note 13, at 850.
42. See Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903). See also Comment,
supra note 13, at 851.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982). See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 13, at 367; S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82, repritled tn 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5787, 5868. The estate also includes "property which the debtor transferred
prior to the commencement of the case but which is recoverable by the trustee pursuant to his avoidance powers, and certain property which the debtor received after the
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estate even that property required for the debtor's fresh start, thereby over44
ruling Lines.
The expansive scope of section 541 means that most, if not all, retirement benefit plans are included in the property of the estate. 4 5 Although it
commencement of the case." A. COHEN, supra note 1, 13-306.1, at 70 (citing 11
U.S.C. § 541(a)(3), (a)(5) (1982)).
There are two exceptions to this broad inclusion provision. The first excludes
any power that the debtor may excercise solely for the benefit of an entity other than
the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (1982) (amended 1984). As an example, Professor
Cohen cites "a power of appointment in a deed containing a clause permitting the
debtor to revoke a grant and transfer the property to third persons other than for the
grantor's own use." A. COHEN, supra note 1, $ 13-306.2, at 76. However, if the debtor
receives any benefit from the excercise of this power, then the power is included in
the estate. Id
The second exception covers any beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust, a
restriction on the transfer of which is enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy
law. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982). This exclusion generally applies to spendthrift
trusts, which are protected from creditors in 40 states. See Vukowich, supra note 16, at
777 (citing G. BOGERT & G.BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 40, at
151 n.27, 152 n.29 (5th ed. 1973)). For a discussion of the cases analyzing this section's applicability to retirement funds, see note 45 infra.
44. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 13, at 368. The House Report states that
§ 54 1(a)(1) "has the effect of overruling Lines v. Frederick. . . . 400 U.S. 18." Id.
(citing Lines, 400 U.S. at 18). See also S. REP. No. 989, supra note 43, at 82. This
legislative history, together with the broad language of § 541(a), led one commentator to conclude that it is no longer appropriate for courts to inject bankruptcy policy
into discussion concerning the scope of the estate. See Epstein, Property of the Estate, in
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 430 (1982)
(Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 276). Though the Code
overruled the Lines Court's definition of the scope of the debtor's estate, the Lines
analysis was not completely disregarded. See Comment, supra note 13, at 851. That
commentator compared the Lines approach and the Code approach, noting that
the Lines decision and its progeny .. .sought to secure [the bankrupt's
fresh start] by judicially "exempting" certain property from the administration of the bankrupt estate through the imposition of seemingly artificial
constructions of the term "property." The Code, however, provides for the
application of minimum federal exemptions to all the debtor's assets. This
indicates a conscious congressional determination of the proper extent of
the fresh start to be granted the debtor.
Id (footnotes omitted).
45. See, e.g., Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1982) (employer funded, ERISA qualified profitsharing and pension plans included
in estate) (citing In re Buren, 6 Bankr. 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (Social Security benefits are property of the estate); In re Howerton, 21 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982)
(debtor-established Individual Retirement Annuity contracts are property of the estate); Clotfelter v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp. (In re Threewitt), 20 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1982) (ERISA qualified pension funded by employer and employee is property
of the estate), ree'd, 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982)).
Various forms of retirement plans have been held to be property of the estate.
See, e.g., Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983) (ERISA qualified
Keogh plan); Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982) (state pension plan); In re
Miller, 33 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983) (employer-funded profitsharing and
pension plans); In re Strasma, 26 Bankr. 449 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983) (ERISA qualified Keogh and employer funded pension plans); In re Watson, 13 Bankr. 391 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1981) (debtor established and controlled cooperative investment plan). Cf
In re Berndt, 34 Bankr. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (ERISA qualified savings and
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enlarged the debtor's estate under the Code, Congress demonstrated its conprofitsharing plan funded by both employee and employer). In Bernd, the bankruptcy court held that the debtor's control of, and access to, his own contributions to
the plan qualified that portion of the fund as property of the estate. Id. at 517. But
the employer's contributions, receivable only upon retirement, disability, termination
of employment, or death, were not classified as property of the estate "because the
debtor ha[d] no present right to withdraw those benefits and no legal right to demand them at the present time in a court of law." Id. (citations omitted).
The principal exception to this general inclusion concerns plans which contain
restrictions on alienation or assignment, as required by law in order to receive
favorable tax treatment. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
§§ 206(d)(1), 1021(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982), I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1982); 26
C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13 (1983). Section 1056(d)(1) requires that "[e]ach pension plan
shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982). Section 401(a)(13) provides: "A trust shall not
constitute a qualified trust under this section unless the plan of which such trust is a
part provides that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1982). Debtors have tried to exclude such plans pursuant
to § 541(c)(2) of the Code, which provides that "[a] restriction on the transfer of the
beneficial interest of a debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982).
Several courts have accepted the argument that the anti-alienation provisions
required for favorable tax treatment do constitute such "restriction[s] on the transfer
of. . . beneficial interest[s]," and have accordingly excluded the plans from the debtors' estates. See, e.g., Clotfelter v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp. (In re Threewitt), 24 Bankr.
927 (D. Kan. 1982) (ERISA qualified pension funded by employer and employee)
(since ERISA anti-alienation provisions are enforceable against general creditors,
they are enforceable against the bankruptcy trustee); In re Pruitt, 30 Bankr. 330
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (ERISA-qualified thrift plan funded by employer and employee) (debtor's interest in ERISA fund is beyond reach of both general creditors
and bankruptcy trustee); In re Rogers, 24 Bankr. 181 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982) (ERISAqualified profitsharing and trust plan funded by employer) (benefits under ERISA
plan receivable only upon retirement, disability, or death and not subject to garnishment are not property of the estate).
The legislative history of the Code is quite clear that § 541 (c)(2) was intended to
apply only to traditional spendthrift trusts. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 13, at
176 ("[t]he bill . . . continues over the exclusion from property of the estate of the
debtor's interest in a spendthrifi trust to the extent the trust is protected from creditors
under applicable State law") (emphasis added). Later in the report's section-by-section analysis, the House Judiciary Committee reiterated: "Paragraph (2) of subsection (c) [of§ 541], however, preserves restrictions on transfer of a spendthrift trust to the
extent that the restriction is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." Id.
at 369 (emphasis added). A "spendthrift trust" is one in which the beneficiary, by
direction of the settlor or statute, may not assign or alienate his right to receive future
payments from the trust. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 43, § 40, at 147.
The purpose of this type of trust is to protect the beneficiary from his own improvidence or incapacity. Id. Most courts have held that the ERISA anti-alienation provisions are merely tax-qualification requirements, not traditional spendthrift clauses,
and thus are not within the scope of the § 541(c)(2) exception. See, e.g., Samore v.
Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984) (§ 541(c)(2) excludes only
traditional spendthrift trusts); Goff v. Taylor (In re Gofl), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983)
("[s]ection 541(c)(2) . . . was never intended [by Congress] to include ERISA in its
reference to 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' "); Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir.
1982) (§ 541(c)(2) does not apply to pensions for the following reasons: legislative
history; statutory language directing use of pensions in Chapter 13 schedule; questionable enforceability of anti-alienation provisions against creditor under state law;
and existence of pension exemption in § 522(d)(10)(E)); In re Strasma, 26 Bankr. 449
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tinued commitment to the fresh start doctrine 46 by enacting a more comprehensive scheme of exemptions than previously existed. 47 Future wage
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983) (§ 541(c)(2) applies only to traditional spendthrift trusts);
Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re DiPiazza), 29 Bankr. 916 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill.
1983) (§ 541(c)(2) does not exclude ERISA qualified pension and profitsharing
plans where debtor has access to benefits); In re Watson, 13 Bankr. 391 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1981) (ERISA spendthrift provisions relate only to tax qualification, not traditional spendthrift trust within § 541(c)(2)).
Finally, it is generally accepted that a settlor may not create a spendthrift trust
with himself as beneficiary. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 43, § 40, at 154.
Accordingly, retirement plans in which the funds are either deposited by the employee or are fully available to him are generally held to have void spendthrift provisions. See, e.g., Goff, 706 F.2d at 587-88 (Keogh plan); DiPiazza, 29 Bankr. at 922
(pension and profitsharing plans to which debtor had full access); In re Howerton, 21
Bankr. 621 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.) (individual retirement annuity contracts), supp. op., 23
Bankr. 58 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
46. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 13, at 126. The House Judiciary Committee reported:
The historical purpose of these exemption laws has been to protect a debtor
from his creditors, to provide him with the basic necessities of life so that
even if his creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will
not be left destitute and a public charge. The purpose has not changed
Id. One commentator explained the Code's approach to the fresh start doctrine:
Section 522, together with the [code's] discharge provision, is central to
the congressional scheme of providing debtors with a "fresh start." Permitting debtors to retain part of their assets while relieving them of all or most
of their debts puts them on the road to a new financial future without the
necessity of assistance from the state, charities or friends.
Vukowich, supra note 16, at 769 (footnotes omitted). See also A. COHEN, supra note 1,
13-301, at 54-55.
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982). The Code now permits a debtor to choose
between two sets of exemptions: those created by the Code itself, or those available
under the laws of the debtor's state of domicile. See id.By establishing a set of federal
bankruptcy exemptions and providing the debtor with a choice between the two
schemes, § 522(b) represents "a significant departure from present law." H.R. REP.
No. 595, supra note 13, at 360.
The Code defines a broad new range of bankruptcy exemptions. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b), (d) (1982). The Code permits the following exemptions, subject to the dollar limits imposed by § 522(d): the bankrupt's homestead; a motor vehicle; household and personal items of small value; jewelry; items related to the debtor's
profession or trade; life insurance policies; the cash surrender value of unmatured life
insurance policies; health aids; wage supplements or substitutes; support benefits;
benefit plans; crime victim's reparation award; wrongful death awards; property
traceable to life insurance policies or payments for bodily injury; and property traceable to payments in compensation for loss of future earnings. A. COHEN, supra note 1,
13-306.32.
These provisions were developed indirectly from the recommendations of the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. See H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 13, at 361 (§ 522(d) "was derived in large part from the Uniform Exemptions Act"); UNIFORM EXEMPTIONs ACT, supra note 10, pref. note, at 365 ("[t]he
Uniform Exemptions Act . . . derived in considerable part from the proposals of the
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws"). Thus, § 522(d) reflects the Commission's recommendation that "kinds of property that traditionally have been treated as exempt
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by state governments form the nucleus of the federal exemptions with appropriate
federal maximums." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, Part I, at 171.
However, these new federal bankruptcy exemptions are not applicable if the
debtor's state of domicile has expressly legislated against their availability. See 11
U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1982). As of early 1983, 34 states had exercised this "opt-out"
power. See Haines, Section 522's Opt-Out Clause: Debtors' Bankruptcy Exempt ons in a Sorry
State, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 4 & n.3. A constitutional argument has been raised to
combat this surge of state activity: state exemption provisions, to the extent they
diverge sharply from those of § 522(d), "are so at odds with federal policy as to be
invalid under the supremacy clause." Id.at 18. However, the one decision in which
this argument prevailed was reversed on appeal. See Rhodes v. Stewart (In re
Rhodes), 14 Bankr. 629 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981), rev'd, 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir.
1983). While other courts have indicated a willingness to consider the question, they
have required the state law effectively to "obstruct the basic objectives of the federal
law," a standard no challenger has met. See In re Parrish, 19 Bankr. 331, 334-35
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1982); In re Vasko, 6 Bankr. 317, 323 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980). One
reason this standard has not been met is that, in opting out of the federal bankruptcy
exemptions, most states updated their own provisions. As Haines has observed:
It can no longer be said that the exemption laws of most states are
hopelessly archaic. Most states have amended their exemption statutes in
the last five years. In virtually all of the [34] states that have opted out of
the federal bankruptcy exemption scheme, the opt-out legislation accompanied or closely preceded review and amendment of the state exemption
laws.
Haines, supra, at 15 (footnotes omitted).
The debtor's second alternative is to avail himself of the exemptions provided in
the scheme of his state of residence or in federal nonbankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b)(2)(A) (1982). This alternative also allows a debtor to exempt an interest in
property held as a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety, "to the extent that such
interest . . . is exempt . . . under applicable nonbankruptcy law." Id.
§ 522(b)(2)(B).
The applicable state exemption scheme is determined by a residency test:
The debtor's available state law exemptions are governed by the law of
the state in which the debtor was domiciled for the longest portion of the
180-day period immediately preceding the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. This provision is intended to minimize, if not preclude,
exemption shopping by an individual debtor who contemplates
bankruptcy.
A. COHEN, supra note 1, 13-306.33[3] (footnote omitted).
The House Judiciary Committee provided a partial list of the federal nonbankruptcy exemptions:
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability payments, 22 U.S.C. [§] 1104;
Social Security payments, 42 U.S.C. [§] 407;
Injury or death compensation payments from war risk hazards, 42 U.S.C.
[§]1717;
Wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices, 46 U.S.C. [§] 601;
Civil service retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. [§§] 729, 2265;
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death and disability benefits, 33 U.S.C. [§]916;
Railroad and Retirement Act annuities and pensions, 45 U.S.C. [§]228(L);
Veterans benefits, 45 U.S.C. [§]352(E);
Special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor, 38
U.S.C. [§]3101; and
Federal homestead lands on debts contracted before issuance of the patent,
43 U.S.C. [§] 175.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 13, at 360.
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substitutes previously immunized under Lines 8a are now analyzed under section 522(d)(10), which exempts "certain benefits which are akin to future
earnings of the debtor."

'4 9

Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts "[t]he debtor's right to receive . . . a

payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar
plan or contract . . . to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of
the debtor ....
"50 Confronted with claims for exemption of various retirement plans, 5 1 courts have developed three distinct approaches to interpret48. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis in Lines, see notes 18-21 and
accompanying text supra. For a comparison of this approach and the Code approach,
see note 44 supra.
49. H.R. REP.No. 595, supra note 13, at 362. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10) (1982).
In addition to the exemption of retirement plans in § 522(d)(10)(E), § 522(d)(10)
exempts without limit social security benefits, unemployment compensation, local
public assistance, veterans' benefits, and disability or illness benefits. See id.
§ 522(d)(10) (A)-(C). The Code also exempts "alimony, support, or separate maintenance, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor." Id. § 522(d)(10)(D).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982). For the full text of § 522(d)(10)(E), see
note 5 supra. As noted earlier, the Code's new set of federal exemptions was based
primarily on the Uniform Exemptions Act, which, in turn, was based on the Commission Report. See note 47 supra. Section 6(a)(5) of the Uniform Exemptions Act,
analogous to § 522(d)(10)(E), provides:
§ 6 (Property Exempt to Extent Reasonably Necessary for Support)
(a) An individual is entitled to exemption of the following property to the
extent reasonably necessary for the support of him and his dependents:
(5)

assets held, payments made, and amounts payable under a stock bonus,

pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract, providing benefits by reason of age, illness, disability, or length of service.
UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS AcT, supra note 10, § 6(a)(5), at 381-82 (emphasis added).
The Commission Report adopted slightly different language in its § 4-503(c)(6):
§ 4-503 Exemptions
(c)

Other Property. The following property shall be allowed as exempt

(6) before or after retirement, such rights as the debtor may have under a
profit sharing, pension, stock bonus, annuity, or similar plan which is established for the primary purpose of providing benefits upon retirement by
reason of age, health, or length of service, and which is either (A) qualified
under section 401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code or any successor thereto,
or (B) established by federal or state statute, to the extent in either case the
debtor's interest therein is reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and his dependents . ...
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, Part II, § 4-503(c)(6), at 125 (emphasis added).

The emphasized language "assets held, payments made, and amounts payable
under," and "such rights as the debtor may have under," became "the right to receive a payment under" in the final draft of § 522(d)(10)(E). See 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(10)(E) (1982). For a discussion of this distinction, see note 10 supra.
51. Aside from claims under § 522(d)(10)(E), a few courts have been faced with
claims for exemption under § 522(b)(2)(A). See Samore v. Graham (In re Graham),
726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.
1983); Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). Sec-
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52

ing section 522(d)(10)(E).
The first approach focuses on the "right to receive a payment" language
of section 522(d)(10)(E), and distinguishes between retirement funds on the
basis of whether the debtor has a present or future entitlement to payments
from the fund. 53 In In re Richard Clark,54 the bankruptcy court held that the
debtor could not exempt the assets in his Keogh plan because his right to
receive payments under the plan would not accrue until some time in the
future. 5 5 The court felt that section 522(d)(10)(E) was inapplicable where
tion 522(b)(2)(A) permits a debtor who opts not to select the federal bankruptcy
exemptions to choose those of his home state as well as those provided under "Federal
law, other than subsection (d) of this section .......
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2) (A) (1982).
The basis for exempting pensions and other retirement plans under this provision is
the restriction on assignment and alienation required by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, a federal law. For a discussion of these restrictions, see
note 45 supra. For a partial listing of other federal laws creating nonbankruptcy exemptions, see note 47 supra.
In Hinshaw, the bankruptcy court acknowledged that the House Judiciary Committee had not expressly stated that the ERISA rules created a federal exemption.
I-hnshaw, 23 Bankr. at 235. But after comparing the statutes which the House Report
expressly listed with ERISA, the court held that the legislative histories of ERISA
and § 522(b)(2)(A) of the Code indicated that ERISA did create a nonbankruptcy
federal exemption. Id. at 235-36.
The two other courts reached the opposite conclusion. In Goff,the Fifth Circuit
gave great weight to the absence of any reference to ERISA in the illustrative listing
of federal exemptions, especially in light of the various specific references to ERISA
elsewhere in the Code. Goff,706 F.2d at 585. This factor, together with the fact that
ERISA's anti-alienation provisions exist only for favorable tax status, and not as an
absolute bar to alienation of pension benefits, led the Fifth Circuit to hold that ERISA plans are not within the "other federal exemption" category. Id. at 585-86. In
Graham, the bankruptcy court also denied the § 522(b)(2)(A) exemption claim, on the
grounds that if Congress had intended the ERISA provisions to exempt pension benefits from creditors, it would have drawn a more specific statute, instead of the general restriction which was intended only as a qualification for preferential tax status.
Graham, 24 Bankr. 305, 311-12 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982). On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed this reasoning, and further distinguished the ERISA provisions from
the nonbankruptcy federal exemptions by noting that the latter were "peculiarly federal in nature created by federal law or related to industries traditionally protected
by the federal government." Graham, 726 F.2d at 1274. By contrast, the court explained, "ERISA regulates private employer pension systems." Id
52. See, e.g., In re Richard Clark, 18 Bankr. 824 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (focusing on the distinction between present and future entitlement to benefits); In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr. 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (focusing on the amount reasonably
necessary for the debtor's support); In re Mendenhall, 4 Bankr. 127 (Bankr. D. Ore.
1980) (denying availability of exemption for Keogh plans).
53. For a discussion of the legislative history of the phraseology of
§ 522(d)(10)(E), and specifically the "right to receive a payment" language, see note
50 supra.

54. 18 Bankr. 824 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (Keogh plan held by 37 year old
doctor).
55. Id. at 828. The Richard Clark court attempted to distinguish In re Donaghy.
Id (citing In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr. 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (allowing exemption
of pension benefits already received by the debtors)). For a discussion of Donaghy, see
notes 62-65 and accompanying text infra.
The bankruptcy court in Richard Clark observed that the debtor had no right to
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the debtor "ha[d] no right to any present benefits, nor ha[d] he received any
previous payment." 56 For this reason, the court did not decide whether the
57
payments were "reasonably necessary" for the debtor's fresh start.
The second approach to interpreting section 522(d)(10)(E) ignores the
receive his Keogh payments. 18 Bankr. at 828. For a discussion of the prohibitions
on premature withdrawal of Keogh fund assets, see note 2 supra. These restrictions do
not create a legal barrier to receiving the funds; they serve only as the bases for
granting favorable tax treatment to the funds. See I.R.C. §§ 72(m)(5), 401(d)(5)(C)
(1982). Faced with a restriction on early withdrawal from a retirement plan which
the debtor sought to exempt, one bankruptcy court noted that "[t]he penalty attached to early withdrawal may make it undesirable to do so, but does not affect the
legal right of the debtor to exercise his withdrawal privilege." In re Watson, 13 Bankr.
391, 392 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (emphasis added). Absent a specific, enforceable
provision in Richard Clark's Keogh plan further denying this legal right, the funds
do appear legally available, given that a beneficiary's right to receive Keogh funds
vests upon contribution. See I.R.C. § 401(d)(2) (A) (1982).
56. Richard Clark, 18 Bankr. at 828 (distinguishing In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr. 677
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
57. Id. at 829. The court's analysis of this issue is difficult to characterize due to
its terseness. The critical language is as follows: "In the instant case the debtor is 37
years of age and actively engaged in the practice of medicine. At the present time he
is receiving no payments under the plan. Thus, the court is not required to determine whether payments are 'necessary for the support of the debtor.' " Id. (quoting
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982)).
The precedential value of Richard Clark is unclear because a subsequent decision
rendered the federal exemption discussion unnecessary. The debtor's election of the
federal bankruptcy exemptions had been challenged by the trustee because Tennessee, pursuant to § 522(b)(1), had opted out of the federal exemption scheme. Richard
Clark, 18 Bankr. at 825. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-112 (1980). The court addressed the § 522(d)(10)(E) question only because another bankruptcy court had
ruled the opt-out legislation unconstitutional. Id See Rhodes v. Stewart (In re
Rhodes), 14 Bankr. 629 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981), rev'd, 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir.
1983). Subsequent to the Richard Clark decision, the constitutionality of the Tennessee opt-out was upheld. See Rhodes v. Stewart (In re Rhodes), 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir.
1983). Accordingly, the § 522(d)(10)(E) analysis in Richard Clark became dictum, for
once the opt-out was validated, "the debtor, of course, would be limited to those
exemptions specified in the Tennessee statutes." Richard Clark, 18 Bankr. at 825 n.2.
For a discussion of the state's option to deny the federal bankruptcy scheme's availability and the constitutionality of legislative action pursuant to such authority, see
note 47 supra.

Two contrary analyses of the present-future distinction have been offered. The
first is that retirement benefits to which the debtor has no present right of access are
not included in the debtor's estate at all. See In re Berndt, 34 Bankr. 515, 517 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1983). According to this minority view, the question of the availability of
an exemption under § 522(d)(10)(E) is thus never reached. See id. For an analysis of
Berndt and a discussion of its distinct minority status, see note 45 supra.
The second view, based on one commentator's analysis of the Code's legislative
history, is that § 522(d)(10)(E) exempts only those benefits to which the debtor has a
future, not a present, right. See Vukowich, supra note 16, at 788. Looking to the
legislative history of the Code, Professor Vukowich concludes that "[t]he exemption
of these various support items [in § 522(d)(10), including retirement benefits,] seems
to apply only to the 'right to receive' them in the future." Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(10) (1982) and citing H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 13, at 362 ("Paragraph
(10) [of 522(d)] exempts certain benefits that are akin to future earnings of the
debtor") (emphasis in original)).
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present-future entitlement distinction and concentrates instead on the extent
to which the benefits in question are "reasonably necessary for the support of
the debtor." 58 A standard for determining what is reasonably necessary for
the support of the debtor was enunciated by the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Connecticut in Warren v. Taf (In re Taft).59 The Taffcourt felt
that the reasonably necessary standard "requires that the court take into
account other income and exempt property of the debtor, present and anticipated."' 60 After this accounting is completed, "the appropriate amount to be
set aside for the debtor ought to be sufficient to sustain his basic needs, not
related to his former status in society or the lifestyle to which he is accustomed but taking into account the special needs that a retired and elderly
'6 1
debtor may claim."
In In re Donaghy,6 2 the bankruptcy court allowed a section 522(d)(10)(E)
exemption for pension plan proceeds which had been fully distributed in a
lump sum payment to the joint debtors prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. 63 The court rejected the argument that the exemption should be
disallowed because the debtors technically did not have any remaining
"right to receive a payment." '6 4 Instead, the court looked to the debtors'
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982). For the full text of§ 522(d)(10)(E), see
note 5 supra.

59. 10 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
60. Id. at 107. In Taff, the bankruptcy court was faced with a debtor with an
annual income of over $37,000, including an annual pension payment of over
$29,000. Id. at 105. In addition to the pension payment, the debtor received over
$6,700 in Social Security benefits annually, and had earned nearly $1,200 in interest
income. Id. Moreover, he was able to exempt other assets exceeding $8,000. Id. at
107.
61. Id. at 107. The court observed that the House Judiciary Committee derived
the federal exemption scheme largely from the Uniform Exemptions Act. Id. at 106
(citing H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 13, at 361). Although the court presumed that
Congress deleted the Uniform Exemptions Act's definition of the "reasonably necessary" phrase in order to permit a case-by-case analysis, the standard which it applied
is nearly identical to that proposed in the Uniform Exemptions Act. Compare Taft, 10
Bankr. at 107, with UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACT, supra note 10, § 6(b) (defining the
phrase as "property required to meet the present and anticipated needs of the individual and his dependents, as determined by the courts after consideration of the
individual's responsibilities and all the present and anticipated property and income
of the individual, including that which is exempt"). Accordingly, the Taff court,
after noting the absence of any "special needs and responsibilities" of the debtor,
allowed an exemption for only one-half of the pension payment. 10 Bankr. at 107.
62. 11 Bankr. 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
63. 11 Bankr. at 680. The debtors, husband and wife, were both in their sixties
and suffering from medical ailments: Mr. Donaghy had emphysema; Mrs. Donaghy
had cancer. Id. at 678. Aside from the retirement fund of over $20,000, which the
debtors received when Mr. Donaghy lost his job as a result of his employer's relocation, the debtors' only other income was a disability payment of less than $500 per
month. Id.
64. Id. at 679-80 (citing Turpin v. Wente (In re Turpin), 644 F.2d 472, 475 (5th
Cir. 1981); Nunnally v. Nunnally (In re Nunnally), 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975)).
The Donaghy court held that as long as the pension payment was intended as a substitute for future wages, it would be "an elevation of form over substance" to deny that
a previously received benefit was not within the literal scope and spirit of
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advanced ages, substantial medical expenses, and minimal resources and allowed the exemption in full on the grounds that the proceeds were reason65
ably necessary for the debtors' support.
Courts taking the reasonable necessity approach have also allowed exemptions under section 522(d)(10)(E) for retirement benefits which the
debtor would not have received until some time in the future. 66 In In re
Kochell,6 7 the district court acknowledged that debtors who did not presently
need or receive retirement benefits could still exempt their future payments
provided that there was some showing that the funds were reasonably necessary for future support. 68 However, because the debtor, a forty-four year old
doctor, had a monthly income which exceeded his monthly expenses by
$1,500.00, the court affirmed the denial of his section 522(d)(10)(E) exemption. 69 Even allowing that exemption provisions should be construed in
favor of the debtor, the court regarded any asserted future need, on the facts
of the case, as purely speculative. 70 In In re Miller,7t the bankruptcy court
held that section 522(d)(10)(E) was available to exempt future benefits provided that the debtor could point to some evidence of future need. 72 Based
§ 522(d)(10)(E). Id.at 680. For a discussion of Turpin and Nunnally, see notes 35-40
and accompanying text supra. By citing Turpin and Nunnally, two pre-Code cases, as
authority for its ruling, the Donaghy court implicitly concluded that the Code would
exempt that which the Act excluded: property needed for the debtor's fresh start. See
Donaghy, 11 Bankr. at 679-80.
65. Donaghy, 11 Bankr. at 679-80. For a discussion of the debtors' special circumstances, see note 63 supra.

66. See In re Kochell, 31 Bankr. 139 (W.D. Wis. 1983), aj'd, 732 F.2d 564 (7th
Cir. 1984); In re Miller, 33 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983).
67. 31 Bankr. 139 (W.D. Wis. 1983), aft, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 140. The district court then quoted extensively from the opinion in
Warren v. Taff. Id. For a discussion of the "reasonably necessary" standard as developed in Taff,see notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
69. See In re Kochell, 26 Bankr. 86, 87 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982), affd, 31 Bankr.
139 (W.D. Wis. 1983), afd, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984). The debtor's income was
approximately $36,000 per month, and he faced approximately $34,000 per month in
expenses, as well as certain other costs relating to professional meetings and license
maintenance. 26 Bankr. at 87.
70. 26 Bankr. at 87-88. The debtor had argued that a future need might arise
which he could not satisfy, citing the possibility that his death could leave his children without the means to pay for their education. Id.at 87. After noting that "the
future. . . contain[s] a more frightening uncertainty for 99.9% of the American population," the bankruptcy court concluded that it would render the "reasonably necessary" phrase meaningless for a court to "insure that no future misfortune could
possibly lower the standard of living to which the debtor's dependents have become
accustomed." Id. Moreover, as the bankruptcy court noted and the district court
reiterated, given the debtor's monthly surplus, the retirement fund could be reestablished in a short period of time. Id.;
31 Bankr. at 141.
71. 33 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983) (employer-funded pension and profitsharing plans).
72. Id.at 552. After quoting the Code's legislative history "that § 522(d)(10)
deals with 'benefits that are akin to future earnings of the debtor,' " the bankruptcy
court concluded: "If it is true that this section deals with the right to future payments, then certainly the necessity for the debtor's support should also be considered
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on a careful reading of Richard Clark and Kochell, the Mller court rejected the
trustee's argument that payments must be currently necessary for the fiftyfour year old debtor's support to be exemptible under section
522(d)(10)(E). 73 Adopting the Taff standard of reasonable necessity, the
court allowed the debtor to retain the full $353.00 per month to which he
74
would be entitled in the future.
A third approach to section 522(d)(10)(E), suggested in dictum by the
bankruptcy court in In re Mendenhall,75 is to hold that the exemption is not
available for assets held in Keogh plans. 76 Language in other cases 77 and
evidence of contrary congressional intent with respect to the Keogh legislation 718 seem to cast doubt on this distinction, and no court has adopted it as a
in the future when the payments will be received." Id.(quoting H.R.
supra note 13, at 362).

REP.

No. 595,

73. Miler, 33 Bankr. at 552. The court acknowledged that in both Richard Clark
and Kochell the claimed exemption for future benefits was disallowed:
A careful reading of both opinions, however, discloses that both courts
relied heavily on the young age of the debtors and thus their distance from
retirement and their substantial incomes which would enable them to replenish their retirement plans sufficiently to provide for their retirements. I
think that Congress intended these provisions to look to the debtors [sic]
future needs as well as the debtor's current needs.
Id.
74. Id. at 553. For an analysis of the Taffcourt's "reasonably necessary" standard, see notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra. The Miller court acknowledged
that the debtor would receive an unspecified amount of Social Security benefits in
addition to the $353 monthly pension benefit once he retired. 33 Bankr. at 553 & n.9.
Aside from the traditionally minimal level of Social Security benefits, the court so
decided because the trustee failed to satisfy his "burden of proving that the exemptions are not property [sic] claims." Id. at n.9.
75. 4 Bankr. 127 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1980). The Code discussion was clearly dictum because the case was decided under the Act. Id. at 131-32.
76. Id. at 131-32. The judge stated:
The bankrupt contends that his Keogh plan funds are entitled to exempt status based upon 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). Section 522(d)(10)(E) is
part of the Bankruptcy Code which was enacted after the bankruptcy petition was filed in this case and therefore is not applicable. Furthermore, I
find that the Keogh plan is not a "payment under a stock bonus, pension,
profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness,
disability, death, age, or length of service."
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982)).
77. See, e.g., Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Richard Clark, 18 Bankr. 824 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982). Dictum in Goff indicated that
the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the bankruptcy court's analysis in Mendenhall, and
would exempt a Keogh plan pursuant to § 522(d)(10)(E) under the appropriate circumstances. See Goff,706 F.2d at 579-80. This statement was also clearly dictum,
because the debtors had chosen the state exemption scheme. Id. at 579. But the
court did observe that"[t]he Goffs' [Keogh] plans did not contain the disqualifying
characteristics and would have been covered by Section 522(d)(10)(E) to the extent
'reasonably necessary' for the Goffs' support." Id.at 579-80 (footnote omitted).
78. See S. REP. No. 992, supra note 2, at 8. The report's analysis begins:
The primary reason for the . . . bill . . . is to give self-employed per-

sons access to retirement plans on a reasonably similar basis to that accorded corporate stockholder employees. It thus tends to correct a
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849

79

basis for its decision.
Against this background, the Third Circuit was called upon in Robert
Clark to review the bankruptcy court's decision 8 ° that Keogh funds to which
the debtor does not presently have access are not exempt under section
522(d)(10)(E). 8 '
Judge Gibbons, writing for the majority, began by identifying the legislative purpose behind the Code's exemption provisions: to provide the
debtor with the basic necessities of life in order to allow him to make a fresh
start after liquidation.8 2 According to the Robert Clark court, exempting present Keogh fund payments from the estate (and from the reach of creditors)
would be consistent with this legislative purpose,8 3 at least to the extent
8 4
these payments were reasonably necessary for the debtor's support.
However, Judge Gibbons continued, exempting a fund to which the
debtor has no present right of access would go beyond the legislative policy
of providing a fresh start. 85 Protection of future Keogh payments could only
demonstrate a concern for the debtor's long-term security, a purpose for
which Judge Gibbons found no support in the Code.8 6 Accordingly, the
discrimination in present law under which self-employed individuals--sole
proprietors and partners-are prevented from participating in retirement
plans established for the benefit of their employees although owners-managers of corporations may do so.
Id. See also Plumb, The Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Exempt and Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REv. 1, 60 n.359 (1975). Plumb, a consultant to
the Commission, said the Commission was aware of the potential inequities of including Keogh plans within the scheme of federal exemptions, and that this was one
motivating factor in the inclusion of a "reasonably necessary" limitation. Id.
79. For a discussion of the approaches which courts have taken concerning retirement plans, see notes 51-74 and accompanying text supra.
80. Clark v. O'Neill (In re Robert H. Clark), No. 82-0494 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982).
81. 711 F.2d at 22.
82. Id. at 23. Judge Gibbons explained the general purpose of the Code's exemption provisions:
The historical purpose of [ ] exemption laws has been to protect a debtor
from his creditors, to provide him with the basic necessities of life so that
even if his creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will
not be left destitute and a public charge. [This] purpose has not changed
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 13, at 126. For a discussion of the fresh
start doctrine, see note 13 and accompanying text supra. For an analysis of the Code's
approach to the doctrine, see note 46 and accompanying text supra.
83. 711 F.2d at 23. For a discussion of cases permitting exemption of retirement
benefits to which the debtor had access, see notes 58-65 and accompanying text supra.
84. 711 F.2d at 23. For a discussion of cases applying the "reasonably necessary" standard, see notes 58-74 and accompanying text supra.
85. See 711 F.2d at 23. For a discussion of Judge Gibbons' rationale for distinguishing between immediate and long-term need, see notes 86-90 and accompanying
text infra.
86. 711 F.2d at 23. While the exemption of present payments was necessary for
the debtor's fresh start, Judge Gibbons noted that "[t]he exemption of future payments. . . demonstrates a concern for the debtor's long-term security which is absent
from the statute." Id. (emphasis supplied by the court).
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Third Circuit denied Clark's claim of exemption for future payments from
8 7

his Keogh fund.

Judge Gibbons regarded the Third Circuit's conclusion as consistent
with preceding cases. 8 In particular, Judge Gibbons drew support from
89
Kochel's holding, which denied an exemption for future pension payments.
To Judge Gibbons, the Kochell court would agree with the Third Circuit that
the underlying purpose of the exemption was to alleviate present rather than
long-term need.90
In a concurring opinion, Judge Becker agreed with the majority's conclusion that Clark was not entitled to exempt his Keogh fund assets from his
bankruptcy estate because, by its terms, the plan terminated upon a judicial
declaration of Clark's insolvency. 9 1
Judge Becker wrote separately, however, because he questioned the
court's interpretation of congressional intent with regard to the protection of
the debtor's "long-term security."' 9 2 The court's opinion, he believed, operated to disadvantage only self-employed individuals in this regard. 93 Judge
87. Id.For a discussion of other limits on the receipt of Keogh funds prior to
reaching the age of 591/2, see note 2 supra.

88. 711 F.2d at 23. Judge Gibbons cited two cases in which bankruptcy courts
had held that Keogh funds were not exempt from distribution to creditors. Id. (citing
In re Richard Clark, 18 Bankr. 824 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Mendenhall, 4
Bankr. 127 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1980)). However, Judge Gibbons recognized that the
authority of Mendenhall was subject to challenge because it was decided under § 70(a)
of the Act, where the debtor's control of the funds was a significant factor. Id.& n.2.
For a discussion of Mendenhall,see notes 31, 33, 75 & 76 and accompanying text supra.
Similarly, the court suggested that Richard Clark was questionable precedent because
the case was decided on alternative state and federal exemption grounds. 711 F.2d at
23. The Richard Clark court did so only because the Tennessee opt-out statute had
been held unconstitutional, a decision which was reversed on appeal after Richard
Clark was decided. For a discussion of this precedential weakness, see note 57 supra.
For a full discussion of Richard Clark, see notes 54-57 and accompanying text supra.
89. 711 F.2d at 23 (citing In re Kochell, 26 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982),
aft'd, 31 Bankr. 139 (W.D. Wis. 1983), aJ'd, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984)). For a
discussion of the analysis in Kochell, see notes 67-70 and accompanying text supra.
90. 711 F.2d at 23. Judge Gibbons also cited, by way of comparison, Donaghy
and Taff,two cases in which the bankruptcy courts exempted all and one-half of the
debtors' received retirement benefits, respectively. Id citing In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr.
677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); Warren v. Taff (In re Taff), 10 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1981)). For a discussion of Donaghy and Taff,see notes 59-65 and accompanying text supra.
91. 711 F.2d at 24-25 (Becker, J., concurring). Judge Becker concluded: "The
funds either have been or are to be distributed, and Clark palpably has no right to
receive payment under any plan on account of illness, disability, death, age or length
of service. Under these circumstances, Clark was not entitled to an exemption." Id
at 25 (Becker, J., concurring).
92. Id at 23-24 (Becker, J., concurring). For a discussion of the majority's analysis of the fresh start doctrine and its inapplicability to the debtor's long-term security, see notes 82-87 and accompanying text supra.
93. 711 F.2d at 24 (Becker, J., concurring). For a discussion of Judge Becker's
views as to the causes of and solutions to this discriminatory effect, see notes 94-99
and accompanying text nfra.
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Becker stated that because Keogh plans and other similar retirement plans,
such as Individual Retirement Accounts, are clearly property of the estate,
while regular corporate employee pension and annuity benefits are not, the
court's holding discriminated against self-employed individuals. 9 4 He felt
that such a result conflicted with "Congress' manifest solicitude for retire95
ment benefits for self-employed individuals.
Judge Becker was reluctant to adopt the majority's interpretation of
legislative intent because it required a result inconsistent with the congressional policy of protecting the retirement benefits of the self-employed. 96 He
felt it would be equally plausible to infer that Congress intended to exempt
all forms of retirement plans.9 7 Although there was some indication in the
legislative history that Keogh funds were not exempt, 98 Judge Becker did
not view this evidence as sufficient to support the discriminatory result
which the majority's conclusion required. 99
94. 711 F.2d at 24 & n. 1 (Becker, J., concurring). For a listing of cases concerning the inclusion of various retirement plans in the debtor's estate, see note 45 supra.
95. 711 F.2d at 24 (Becker, J., concurring). For a discussion of the legislative
policy of protecting self-employed individuals as reflected in the Keogh legislation,
see note 78 and accompanying text supra.
96. 711 F.2d at 24 (Becker, J., concurring). For a discussion of this conflict of
policy, see notes 78 & 95 and accompanying text supra.
97. 711 F.2d at 24 (Becker, J., concurring). Judge Becker reasoned that
[s]ection 522(d)(10)(E) exempts the debtor's right to receive payments
"under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similarplan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service. ....
"
A Keogh plan would seem to be "similar" to a pension or annuity plan,
payments under both of which are exempt under this statute although they
presumably represent long-term security arrangements.
Id.(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982)) (emphasis supplied by Judge Becker).
98. Id. at 24 (Becker, J., concurring). Judge Becker recognized that Congress
had rejected the more liberal language of both the Uniform Exemptions Act and the
Commission Report, though it used both as guidelines. Id.& n.2. The Uniform Exemptions Act exempted "assets held, payments made, and amounts payable" under
the various plans. UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS AcT, supra note 10, § 6(a)(5). The Commission Report recommended exempting, "before or after retirement, such rights [to
different retirement benefits] as the debtor may have. . . ." COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 10, Part II, § 4-503(c)(6). However, the Code exempts only "[t]he debtor's
right to receive a payment" under these plans. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982).
Nevertheless, Judge Becker cautioned against using an unexplained language difference to establish a congressional intent which seemed contrary to previously expressed philosophies. 711 F.2d at 24 (Becker, J., concurring). Although the majority
did not delve into the evolution of § 522(d)(10)(E), it reached the same conclusion
regarding the effect of the language change as the bankruptcy court which had discussed the development of this exemption. See ia. Judge Becker also expressed concern that the language of the bankruptcy court's opinion, insofar as it found a
congressional intent to exclude Keogh plans from exemption, implied that even present Keogh payments would not be exempt. Id.
99. 711 F.2d at 24 (Becker, J., concurring). The legislative history provided
some evidence of legislative intent, but Judge Becker cautioned:
[It is not the strongest of evidence-there is nothing but the fact of the
difference in language to go on. The legislative history nowhere discusses
the changes made or their intended impact. I would thus be reluctant to
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Judge Becker lamented that the "appropriate resolution of these issues
is thus far from clear." 10 0 However, he was able to concur in the majority's
judgment on the narrower ground that the terms of Clark's Keogh plan pro0
vided that the debtor's adjudication as bankrupt terminated the plan.' '
Reviewing the court's opinion, it is initially submitted that the majority's premise that Clark had no "right to receive a payment" from his Keogh
plan is subject to question.' 0 2 It is clear that any withdrawal he would have
made would have been subject to a tax penalty because he had not reached
fifty-nine and one-half years of age. 10 3 However, several courts have indicated that this financial penalty does not affect the beneficiary's right to
receive payments from the fund. 10 4 To the extent that the Third Circuit
would exempt payments to which the debtor has a right of access, it is suggested that Keogh payments ought to be included within that exemption. 105
It is also submitted that the court's analysis of the Code's treatment of
the debtor's present and future security is inconsistent with the consensus of
1 6
The Third
well-reasoned opinions interpreting section 522(d) (10) (E).
rely on this inference of intent, given the incongruity of the result for different retirement plans.
Id.

100. Id. Judge Becker suggested that Congress, because it may have overlooked
the question, "focus its attention upon these matters." Id. n.3. (Becker, J.,
concurring).
101. 711 F.2d at 24-25 (Becker, J., concurring).
102. See 711 F.2d at 22-23. The Third Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's
ruling, which it read to hold that "because Clark had no present right to receive
payments from the plan, his exemption claim did not fall within the literal terms of
section 522(d)(10)(E)." Id. at 22.
103. See I.R.C. § 72(m)(5) (1982). Since Clark was 43 years old, he would have
faced a penalty tax of 10% in addition to the income tax due on the funds prematurely received. For a discussion of these restrictions on Keogh plans, see note 2 supra.
104. See, e.g., In re Watson, 13 Bankr. 391, 392 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981). For a
discussion of this aspect of Watson, see note 35 supra. See also Eisenberg v. Baviello (In
re Baviello), 12 Bankr. 412, 415 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (Keogh plan); In re Mace, 16
COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 254, 261 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1978) (IRA). In Bavtillo and
Mace, cases decided under the Act, the debtor's control of the retirement fund deter-

mined whether the fund was included in the estate. Eisenberg, 12 Bankr. at 415; Mace,
16 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) at 261. Both cases held that the tax penalty did not
constitute a restriction on access to the fund which affected the debtors' control. Elsenberg, 12 Bankr. at 415; Mace, 16 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) at 261. For a discussion of these cases in this respect, see note 34 supra.
105. The Third Circuit clearly held that present payments are exempt under

section 522(d)(10)(E) "to the extent they are necessary for the support of the debtor."
711 F.2d at 23. If the majority would distinguish "present payments" from a present
right to receive a payment, and hold that the latter are exempt only if currently
received, it is submitted that such a distinction is as untenable as it is unwarranted.
For a criticism of the majority's approach, see notes 121-25 and accompanying text
tnfra.
106. See In re Kochell, 31 Bankr. 139 (W.D. Wis. 1983), affg 26 Bankr. 86
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982), af'd, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Miller, 33 Bankr.
549 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983); In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr. 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981);

Warren v. Taff (In re Tafi), 10 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981). For a discussion
of the approaches taken by these courts, see notes 58-74 and accompanying text supra.
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Circuit acknowledged that the fresh start doctrine-which is designed to prevent the debtor whose assets are distributed to his creditors from becoming a
public charge' 0 7-remained an integral policy of the Code. 10 8 Yet, while
citing the Donaghy court's conclusion as comparative authority for its holding,' 0 9 the majority ignored the essence of the Donaghy court's analysis that it
is the character of the funds for which an exemption is claimed, not the
timing of their disbursement, which determines the legitimacy of the exemption." 0 According to the bankruptcy court in Donaghy, section 522(d)(10)(E)
and the fresh start doctrine combine to make the relevant inquiry whether
the retirement benefit "is intended to function as a wage substitute at some
future period" when it will be needed to "support the basic requirements of
life" for the debtor, regardless of when it is received."''
The Third Circuit's principal reliance on Kochell, 1 2 it is submitted, reflects a fundamental problem of misconstruction. The court reads Kochell to
107. For a discussion of the fresh start doctrine, see note 13 Supra.
108. See 711 F.2d at 23 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, supranote 13, at 126). For a
discussion of the Code's approach to the fresh start doctrine, see note 46 supra.
109. See 711 F.2d at 23 (citing In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr. 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1981)). The Third Circuit also cited, for comparison, Warren v. Taff. See id. (citing 10
Bankr. at 101). For a discussion of the Donaghy analysis, see notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the analysis in Taft, see notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra. The Robert Clark court apparently cited these cases for
comparison because both granted at least some exemption under § 522(d)(10)(E) for
retirement benefits which either had been or were being received. See Donaghy, 11
Bankr. at 679-80; Taft, 10 Bankr. at 107.
110. See Donaghy, 11 Bankr. at 670-80. The court characterized the trustee's arument that the debtors' exemption claim did not fall within the terms of
522(d) (10) (E), because they had already been received, as "an elevation of form
over substance." Id. The bankruptcy court continued:
The identifiable sum, although received by the debtors before they could
file their joint petition, is a tangible reflection of "the debtor's right to receive . . . a payment under a . . . pension . . . plan" within the literal

language of Code § 522(d)(10)(E) and in the spirit of the Congressional intent to exempt qualified pension benefits that are "akin to future earnings
of the debtor."
Id. at 680 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note
13, at 362).
111. 11 Bankr. at 680. The Donaghy court had used the Fifth Circuit's analysis
in Turpbh and Nunna/ly as support for its conclusion that retirement benefits were an
integral part of the debtor's fresh start because they would be necessary in thefuture.
See id. at 679 (citing Turpin v. Wente (In re Turpin), 644 F.2d 472, 475 (5th Cir.
1981); Nunnally v. Nunnally (In re Nunnally), 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975)). For a
discussion of Turpin and Nunna/(y, see notes 35-40 and accompanying text supra.
While these cases were decided under the Act, they are relevant with respect to the
scope of protection which the fresh start doctrine provides for retirement benefits. See
Donaghy, 11 Bankr. at 679-80.
112. See 711 F.2d at 23. The majority recognized that the two other cases which
it cited were of questionable precedential value. See 711 F.2d at 23 (citing In re Richard Clark, 18 Bankr. 824 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Mendenhall, 4 Bankr. 127
(Bankr. D. Ore. 1980)). For a discussion of the limited predential value of Richard
Clark, see note 57 supra. For a discussion of the weakness of Mendenhall as authority
for the Third Circuit's holding, see notes 75-76 and accompanying text supra.
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support the proposition that "the underlying purpose of [section
522(d)(10)(E)] was to alleviate present, rather than long-term need. 11' 3 But
the bankruptcy court in Kochell held only that on the facts of that case there
was no conceivable situation in which the funds could be considered necessary for the debtor's support, and that the section 522(d)(10)(E) exemption
was not designed to protect against any future misfortune." 4 This language,
it is suggested, does not support the conclusion that the Code was unconcerned with the debtor's long-term security; in fact, the district court in
Kochell, affirming the bankruptcy court's denial of the exemption claim, expressly recognized that future needs ought to be considered, even in the absence of present need, if there is "some showing that the funds are reasonably
'
necessary for future support." 15
Further support for this proposition is provided by the holding and
analysis of the bankruptcy court in Miller.'"6 Reading Kochell and Richard
Clark as relying on the youth of the debtors and their abilities to re-establish
their retirement plans, the Miller court held that the debtor's future payments could be exempted if a future need were shown.' 'I
Finally, Judge Becker, while raising the important question of the
Code's concern for the debtor's long-term security," 8 concurred in the majority's judgment on equally infirm grounds.' 1 9 By denying the exemption
113. 711 F.2d at 23.
114. See Kochell, 26 Bankr. at 87-88. For a discussion of the emphasis which the
bankruptcy court in Kochell placed on the purely speculative nature of the .debtor's
claimed future need, see note 70 and accompanying text supra.
115. Kochell, 31 Bankr. at 140. As one example of such a situation, the district
court cited a "debtor in ill health and declining years [who] could readily demonstrate that the funds would be reasonably necessary for his support." Id. at 141.
However, the record in Kochell "disclose[d] no evidence whatsoever that the funds
[were] necessary for the debtor's needs, either immediate or future." Id at 140.
116. In re Miller, 33 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983). For a discussion of
Miler, see notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra.
117. Miller, 33 Bankr. at 552. For a discussion of this aspect of the Mdler court's
analysis, see notes 72-73 and accompanying text supra. In fact, the Miller court, using
the Taffstandard, granted the claimed exemption, although the debtor had not yet
begun receiving his benefits. See Mdler, 33 Bankr. at 553. For a discussion of the
Miller court's application of the Tafstandard, see note 74 and accompanying text
supra.

118. See 711 F.2d at 23-24 (Becker, J., concurring). However, it is submitted
that Judge Becker's principal concern-that the majority's decision discriminates
against self-employed individuals contrary to congressional intent-is unsupported
by the case law. See id. For a discussion of Judge Becker's concern about this alleged
discriminatory effect, see notes 92-96 and accompanying text supra. Given the
breadth of § 541(a), Judge Becker's unsupported contention that "[tihe majority's
holding will not affect employee pension and annuity plans created by employers,
because the assets of such plans would not be included in the debtor's estate under
section 541," is subject to question. See Robert Clark, 711 F.2d at 23-24 (Becker, J.,
concurring). For a discussion of cases supporting the proposition that § 541(a) includes most, if not all, retirement plans, including these employer-created plans, see
note 45 and accompanying text supra. Thus, Judge Becker's concern about the scope
of the majority's decision should extend to all forms of retirement plans.
119. 711 F.2d at 24-25 (Becker, J., concurring). For an analysis of Judge
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claim because Clark had already received his benefits, Judge Becker disregarded the admonition of the Donaghy court against raising form over substance by refusing to consider whether the Keogh payments retained their
1 20
character as future support payments.
Analyzing the impact of the Third Circuit's decision in Robert Clark, it is
submitted that the court has painted an inappropriate bright line to guide
future courts in their interpretation of section 522(d) (10) (E). 12' The court's
analysis would clearly deny an exemption claim for funds from which the
debtor is not receiving payments. 122 It could also deny an exemption for
future payments due under a plan from which the debtor has begun receiving benefits. 123 Such a result would destroy the principal purpose of section
522(d)(10)(E), 124 and reinforces the importance of assessing the degree to
which a debtor's retirement benefits are reasonably necessary for his support.1 2 5 Given the small and inconsistent body of case law interpreting section 522(d)(10)(E), it is imperative that Congress act to define its intentions
Becker's reasons for agreeing with the judgment of the court, see note 91 and accompanying text supra.
120. See 711 F.2d at 24-25 (Becker, J., concurring). The inconsistency between
Judge Becker's concurring opinion and the Donaghy court's opinion could not be
clearer. Judge Becker concluded that Clark was not entitled to an exemption because "[t]he funds either have been or are to be distributed, and Clark palpably has
no right to receive payment under any plan .... " Id. at 25 (Becker, J., concurring).
For a discussion of the Donaghy court's response to the same argument, see note 110
and accompanying text supra.
121. For a criticism of this approach, which fails to reach the reasonable necessity issue if there is no present payment, see notes 106-17 and accompanying text
supra.

122. See 711 F.2d at 23. For a discussion of cases taking a contrary approach
and looking to the reasonable necessity criterion as dispositive, see notes 66-74 and
accompanying text supra.
123. It is true that the majority opinion, by citing Taffas comparative authority,
probably does not contemplate denying an exemption for subsequent payments
under a plan from which the debtor has begun receiving payments. But the entire
thrust of the majority's analysis compares present and future payments and their
impact on the debtor's short-term and long-term security. See 711 F.2d at 23.
The bankruptcy court is even more explicit. After discussing the history of the
phraseology of§ 522(d)(10)(E), the bankruptcy court concluded that "[t]he clear language of Section 522(d)(10)(E) limits such exemption to payments made under a plan
Clark v. O'Neill (In re Clark), No. 82-0494, slip op. at
such as the Keogh plan ....
8 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 28, 1982) (emphasis added). The "payments made" language,
according to the bankruptcy court, contrasts with the "assets held . . . and amounts
payable" language of the Uniform Exemptions Act, which Congress rejected. Id. at 78 (emphasis added). As Judge Becker observed, this "analysis would seem to foreclose exemption of Keogh assets even if a debtor's right to receive payment had
vested because he or she had reached retirement age." 711 F.2d at 24 (Becker, J.,
concurring).
124. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 13, at 362 (§ 522(d)(10)(E) exempts
"benefits akin to future earnings"). For a discussion of the essentially forward-looking nature of § 522(d)(10)(E), see Md/er, 33 Bankr. at 552.
125. For a discussion of cases relying solely on the "reasonably necessary" provision, see notes 59-74 and accompanying text supra.
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more clearly with regard to this section's applicability to future retirement
fund benefits. 126
Thomas . Spencer
126. This view is shared by Judge Becker. See 711 F.2d at 24 n.3 (Becker, J.,
concurring).
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